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Abstract
Empirical failure of uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) has become a stylized
fact. VARs by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Scholl and Uhlig (2008)
find delayed overshooting of the exchange rate in response to a monetary
shock. This result contradicts Dornbusch’s (1976) original overshooting, which
is based on UIP. This paper presents a model in which assets eligible for central
bank’s open market operations, such as government bonds, command liquidity
premia. Further, I allow for a key currency which is required to participate in
international goods trade. Therefore, assets allowing access to key currency
liquidity are held by agents around the globe. I show that liquidity premia
lead to a modified UIP condition. In response to a monetary policy shock,
the model predicts delayed overshooting of the nominal exchange rate, as in
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995).
JEL classification: E4; F31; F42.
Keywords: Monetary policy, uncovered interest rate parity,
liquidity premium, key currency.
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1 Introduction
Empirical studies reject uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), which states that a currency
is expected to depreciate relative to another country’s currency when the interest rate dif-
ference to that country is positive. One aspect of empirical failure of UIP is that exchange
rates do not react to interest rate shocks as predicted by Dornbusch’s (1976) overshooting
but are characterized by delayed overshooting, as documented by Eichenbaum and Evans
(1995). This paper takes the evidence against UIP as a starting point and develops a
model in which there is a spread between interest rates paid on assets eligible for central
bank’s open market operations and those paid on ineligible assets, i.e. a liquidity pre-
mium. The model further allows for a key currency which is required to participate in
international trade. Therefore, assets allowing access to key currency liquidity are held
by agents around the globe. This paper shows that the liquidity premium implied by this
setup generates deviations from UIP and offers an explanation for delayed overshooting.
Moreover, it analyzes how the international transmission of shocks is affected by modeling
key currency liquidity.
Empirical failure of UIP is documented by various types of evidence including forward
premium regressions, vector autoregressions (VARs) and model estimations. Testing UIP
by applying regression analysis is difficult because expectations cannot be measured. How-
ever, as pointed out by Chinn (2006), UIP can be tested jointly with the assumption of
rational expectations. In the forward premium regression, empirical studies regress real-
ized exchange rate changes on the interest rate difference (the forward premium) between
two countries. Under rational expectations and risk neutrality, UIP predicts this regres-
sion to yield a positive coefficient of unity. Froot (1990) finds that the average estimate
of this coefficient across 75 published studies is -0.88 with only a few estimates above zero
and none greater than unity. The finding of a negative coefficient in the forward premium
regression has become known as the forward premium puzzle.2 It implies that the forward
premium predicts exchange rate movements inconsistent with theory not only in magni-
tude, but also in terms of the direction of the movement.3 When investors are risk averse,
the UIP condition allows for risk premia, which are positive when an asset’s domestic
currency return is positively correlated to consumption growth. A large literature which
follows up on the seminal contribution analyzes the capability of risk premia to reconcile
UIP with the data. The seminal contribution of Fama (1984) shows that a negative co-
efficient in the forward premium regression implies that the risk premium would have to
be negatively correlated to, and more volatile than, the expected exchange rate change.
2Recent improvements in data availability have spurred a re-evaluation of these results with respect to
maturities and countries. Chinn (2006) and Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) confirm the forward premium
puzzle for short maturities in developed economies, but find evidence supportive of UIP with respect to
long horizons and for emerging economies.
3Surveys of this literature include Froot and Thaler (1984), Engel (1996) and Taylor (1995).
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There is consensus that the volatility of the risk premium implied by Fama’s conditions
is too high for any reasonable risk premium (see Froot and Thaler (1984) and Backus,
Foresi, and Telmer (2001)), so that empirical UIP failure has become a stylized fact.4
A second type of evidence documents the empirical failure of uncovered interest rate
parity: Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) estimate a VAR to analyze the impact of monetary
policy shocks on exchange rates. Their conclusion is known as the delayed overshooting
puzzle: In contrast to Dornbusch’s (1976) overshooting, which is based on UIP, they find
that a contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock leads the dollar to appreciate contin-
uously until it peaks after around three years. Some studies question the identification
assumptions made by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and find evidence in line with Dorn-
busch’s overshooting (see Kim and Roubini (2000) and Faust and Rogers (2003)). How-
ever, Scholl and Uhlig (2008) reconfirm the delayed overshooting result and find that the
exchange rate peaks between 17 and 26 months after a monetary shock.
A third type of evidence stems from estimations of small open economy models, which
commonly include a UIP condition. Justiniano and Preston (2010) find that their model
cannot account for the observed co-movement of Canadian and U.S. business cycles. Fur-
ther, volatility in the real exchange rate is virtually entirely caused by shocks to an ad-hoc
risk premium, so that the authors find an extreme version of exchange rate disconnect.5
Justiniano and Preston (2010) suggest that the failure of the model to associate movements
of exchange rates with fundamentals is related to its poor performance. Thus, improving
the exchange rate predictions of economic models is a promising avenue to enhance the
quantitative performance of open economy models.
This paper does not deal with risk premia but combines two features, liquidity and key
currency pricing : First, as is conveyed in anecdotal evidence - for instance about recurring
flight to quality and flight to liquidity episodes - and in empirical studies, interest rates
on assets vary not only according to their risk but also as a function of their liquidity. For
instance, Longstaff (2004) shows that U.S. Treasury bonds pay lower interest rates than
Refcorp bonds, which are backed by the Treasury, and finds that the premium is related
to indicators of liquidity preferences.6 In a closed economy, Reynard and Schabert (2009)
show that taking into account liquidity premia by modeling open market operations can
4Recently, some authors challenge this view: Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) find that high-interest rate
currencies depreciate on average when consumption growth is low, so that a consumption based risk
premium can explain excess returns if one is willing to assume large coefficients of risk aversion. Alvarez,
Atkeson, and Kehoe (2009) build a model where asset markets are segmented, so that the investor’s
marginal utility varies more than indicated by fluctuations in aggregate consumption. This can increase
the fluctuations of the risk premium.
5Lubik and Schorfheide (2006) obtain a qualitatively identical result.
6Further evidence documenting liquidity premia is given by Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) and
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2007) who find that the supply of Treasury debt (relative to GDP)
is negatively correlated to the spread between corporate and Treasury bond yields, even when controlling
for default risk.
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align observed interest rates and their theoretical counterparts. Further, they demonstrate
that monetary transmission is fundamentally affected. This suggests that the international
transmission of shocks can be improved by a model analyzing the impact of liquidity on
interest and exchange rates. The second feature relates to the leading role of the U.S. dollar
in the international monetary system. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) coin the term
key currency pricing, which states that a large share of international trade is conducted
in dollars. Key currency pricing implies that importers and exporters find it convenient
to hold dollar assets to facilitate their transactions. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007)
argue that such liquidity services provided by key currency bonds are the driving force
behind relatively low U.S. interest rates, which imply an "exorbitant privilege" for the
United States.7
This paper combines these two observations and analyzes the impact of key currency
pricing and liquidity on exchange rate dynamics. I develop a two-country open economy
model with explicit open market operations in the foreign country (the key currency
country), which are modeled as in Reynard and Schabert (2009): The foreign central bank
supplies cash in exchange for foreign government bonds, so that these pay lower interest
rates compared to assets not eligible for open market operations. Liquidity demand is
motivated from households’ demand for goods purchases, which require cash. Key currency
pricing implies that households in the home economy require foreign currency to purchase
import goods and hold foreign government bonds despite their low interest rates. I analyze
how this setup affects uncovered interest rate parity and exchange rate movements, in
particular in response to monetary policy shocks. The goal is to answer the following
questions: Can liquidity premia generate deviations from uncovered interest rate parity?
Can key currency effects reconcile theory and empirical evidence, for instance with respect
to delayed overshooting? Does modeling key currency liquidity affect the international
transmission of shocks in a fundamental way?
The main aim of the present paper is thus a positive analysis of monetary transmission,
with a particular focus on asset prices and exchange rates. It addresses deficits of current
asset pricing conditions, in particular UIP, and aims to advance consumption based asset
pricing theory, suggesting that liquidity premia play an important role in determining
exchange rates and international interest rate differences. Because asset pricing conditions
are an important ingredient to currently used macroeconomic models, this can improve
the empirical performance of these models, as suggested by the work of Justiniano and
Preston (2010). Further, compared to standard models, the present model implies lower
risk free interest rates and can thus contribute to solving the risk free rate puzzle, see Weil
(1989).
7This quote is attributed to Charles de Gaulle but stems from Valery Giscard d’Estaing, who was French
finance minister at the time of the statement. See Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007).
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In the literature, the present work is most closely related to Canzoneri, Cumby, and
Diba (2007). Like them, this paper stresses the importance of the U.S. dollar in inter-
national trade and models liquidity services provided by government bonds. However,
both the setup and goal of this paper are different. The model in this paper builds on
Reynard and Schabert (2009), so that liquidity premia in the model analyzed in this paper
are microfounded and endogenously derived from households’ demand for cash. In con-
trast, Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) employ an ad hoc specification for the liquidity
services provided by government bonds. Further, these authors focus on asymmetries in
fiscal and monetary policy transmission between countries and do not address delayed
overshooting.
The results of my analysis are the following. I show that modeling key currency
liquidity generates deviations from UIP and demonstrate that the key currency model
predicts delayed overshooting of the nominal exchange rate, as in Eichenbaum and Evans
(1995). The reason is that a rising foreign monetary policy rate increases the interest
rate on foreign government bonds but reduces liquidity premia overproportionately. This
reduces the marginal benefit of investing in foreign government bonds, so that the foreign
currency is expected to appreciate. I find an exchange rate peak after seven quarters, in
line with the empirical evidence.
This paper is structured as follows. The model is presented in section 2. A modified
uncovered interest parity condition, which contains a liquidity premium, is derived in sec-
tion 3. Building on these results, section 4 analyzes the response of interest and exchange
rates to monetary policy shocks. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Setup and timing of events
I model a small open economy (SOE) and its interactions to a large foreign economy,
say the United States, which is explicitly modeled so that the impact of shocks to the
foreign economy on the small home country can be analyzed. In the domestic and foreign
economies, there is a continuum of infinitely lived households. I assume that households
in both economies have identical asset endowments and preferences, so that I can consider
a representative household in each country. As in Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007), I
assume key currency pricing: International goods trade is carried out in terms of the foreign
economy’s currency, while domestic goods are purchased with local currency.8 Moreover, it
is assumed that the law of one price holds, so that exchange rate pass-through is perfect.
Further, I analyze a foreign economy which is relatively large compared to the home
8This is equivalent to assuming producer currency pricing for large economy exports and local currency
pricing for small economy exports.
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economy, so that the home economy does not influence the foreign economy. However,
I take into account the impact of home holdings of foreign assets on asset stocks in the
foreign economy.
In the following, the timing of events is described. The representative household in
the home economy enters the period with holdings of foreign currency MF,t−1, domestic
and foreign private debt Dt−1, DF,t−1 and foreign government bonds BF,t−1.
9 Foreign
households enter the period with holdings of foreign currency M∗F,t−1, foreign government
bonds B∗F,t−1 and foreign private debt D
∗
F,t−1. For simplicity, I neglect domestic govern-
ment bonds and assume that domestic households hold domestic currency only within
periods. Further, it is assumed that firms in each country are owned by local households.
1. At the beginning of the period, shocks realize, households supply labor nt and n
∗
t
and firms produce goods.
2. The foreign money market opens and both domestic and foreign households can ex-
change foreign government bonds BF,t−1 and B
∗
F,t−1 for money at the policy rate
Rm∗t . The amounts IF,t and I
∗
F,t of foreign currency which home and foreign house-
holds can obtain in open market operations are therefore constrained by
IF,t≤
BF,t−1
Rm∗t
, (1)
I∗F,t≤
B∗F,t−1
Rm∗t
. (2)
With respect to the home money market, I assume abundant supply of collateral, so
that home households can obtain cash Mt at the opportunity cost Rt − 1.
10
3. Households in both countries enter the goods markets, where goods can be bought
with currency only. Key currency pricing requires import goods in both countries
to be purchased with foreign currency only. Further, households in both economies
purchase domestic goods with their domestic currencies. Thus, households in the
9Throughout the paper, the subscripts H and F refer to home and foreign origin of goods and assets. An
asterisk denotes variables decided upon by foreign agents. Verbally, I distinguish between both economies
by using the terms "foreign" or "large" economy versus "home" or "small" economy. The terms "local"
and "domestic" can refer to either economy, depending on the context. Further, upper case letters refer
to nominal variables while lower case letters denominate real variables.
10More explicitly, at the beginning of the period, households in the small open economy can exchange
their holdings of private debt against cash at a discount identical to the interest rate on private debt, Rt.
As private debt can be created by households at no cost, this constraint does not bind in equilibrium. I
further assume that home households can engage in repurchase operations only, so that they will not hold
domestic money across periods. Seigniorage is transferred back to households via a lump sum transfer.
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small open economy are constrained by
P ∗F,tcF,t≤ IF,t +MF,t−1, (3)
PH,tcH,t≤Mt, (4)
where cF,t and cH,t denote home consumption of foreign and, respectively, domestic
goods and where PH,t is the price of home goods in home currency and P
∗
F,t is the
price of foreign goods in terms of foreign currency. Households in the large economy
require foreign currency for their entire goods purchases and are thus constrained by
P ∗F,tc
∗
t ≤ I
∗
F,t +M
∗
F,t−1. (5)
4. Before the asset markets open, households in both countries receive dividends Ptδt
and wages Ptwtnt as well as government transfers τ t and τ
∗
t . Further, repurchase
agreements are settled. I assume that the foreign central bank conducts repo oper-
ations amounting to MR∗F,t +M
R
F,t = Ω
(
M∗F,t +MF,t
)
, where MR∗F,t and M
R
F,t is the
amount of money repurchased from foreign and, respectively, home households.
5. The asset markets open. Home households can carry wealth into the next period
by purchasing domestic private debt Dt, foreign government bonds BF,t and foreign
currency MF,t. Foreign households invest into foreign assets only and acquire gov-
ernment bonds B∗F,t, money M
∗
F,t as well as private debt D
∗
F,t. The interest rates on
domestic private debt, foreign government bonds and foreign private debt are given
by Rt, R
∗
t and R
D∗
t .
2.2 The home economy
2.2.1 Households
Households maximize the expected sum of the discounted stream of instantaneous utilities
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [u (ct, nt)] , (6)
where u is separable in its arguments, increasing, twice continuously differentiable, strictly
concave and satisfies the Inada conditions, β is the households’ discount factor and nt is the
share of his time endowment a household spends working. Home households’ consumption
is a composite good of foreign and domestic goods
ct = γc
1−η
H,t c
η
F,t, (7)
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where γ−1 = ηn (1− η)1−η and η provides an openness measure of the home country.
Households maximize utility subject to the asset market constraint,
St
[
MF,t −MF,t−1 +
BF,t
R∗t
−BF,t−1 +
DF,t
RD∗t
−DF,t−1 + P
∗
t IF,t (R
m∗
t − 1)
]
≤Ptwtnt + Ptδt + Ptτ t −Mt (Rt − 1)−
Dt
Rt
+Dt−1 − PH,tcH,t − StP
∗
F,tcF,t,
where St refers to the nominal exchange rate, i.e. the price of a unit of foreign cur-
rency in terms of domestic currency, the cash in advance constraints for imported and
domestic goods, (3)-(4), the open market constraint (1) and the non-negativity constraints
MF,t,Mt, BF,t ≥ 0 as well as the no-Ponzi game condition lims→∞Et
s∏
i=0
DF,t+s/Rt+i ≥ 0.
The first order conditions for working time nt, domestic and foreign consumption cH,t and
cF,t, open market operations IF,t, holdings of domestic and foreign money, and investment
into home and foreign private debt as well as foreign government bonds are given by
λtwt=−un,t, (8)(
λt + ψH,t
) PH,t
Pt
=uc,tγ (1− η)
(
cF,t
cH,t
)η
, (9)
(
ψF,t + λt
)
qt=uc,tγη
(
cF,t
cH,t
)η−1
, (10)(
ψF,t + λt
)
qt=(λt + µt)R
m
t qt, (11)
ψH,t=λt (Rt − 1) , (12)
λtqt=βEtqt+1
λt+1 + ψF,t+1
π∗t+1
, (13)
λt=βEt
λt+1Rt
πt+1
, (14)
λtqt=βEtqt+1
λt+1RD∗t
π∗t+1
, (15)
λtqt=βEtqt+1
λt+1 + µt+1
π∗t+1
R∗t , (16)
where ψH,t, ψF,t, µt and λt are the respective Lagrange multipliers on the cash, open
market, and asset market constraints, qt = StP ∗t /Pt is the real exchange rate and π
∗
t =
P ∗t /P
∗
t−1 and πt = Pt/Pt−1 are foreign and domestic (CPI) inflation. The budget constraint
binds in equilibrium, λt > 0, because the disutility of working is strictly negative, un,t < 0.
The complementary slackness conditions are given by
ψH,t ≥ 0, Mt − PH,tcH,t ≥ 0, ψH,t (Mt − PH,tcH,t) = 0,
ψF,t ≥ 0, MF,t + IF,t − P
∗
F,tcF,t ≥ 0, ψF,t
(
MF,t + IF,t − P
∗
F,tcF,t
)
= 0,
µt ≥ 0, IF,t −BF,t−1/R
m∗
t ≥ 0, µt ( IF,t −BF,t−1/R
m∗
t ) = 0,
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and the transversality condition requires lims→∞Et
s∏
i=0
DF,t+s/Rt+i = 0. From (9) and
(10), observe that both imported and domestically produced goods are subject to a cash
credit friction. This implies that households’ optimal allocation of consumption good
spending depends not only on the relative prices of foreign and domestic goods, but also
on foreign and domestic interest rates. Using (9)-(11) and (7), I demonstrate in Appendix
A.1.1 that demand for foreign and domestic goods is given by
cF,t=
ηuc,t
(λt + µt)R
m∗
t
q−1t ct, (17)
cH,t=
(1− η)uc,t(
λt + ψH,t
) (PH,t
Pt
)
−1
ct. (18)
Further, (15) and (16) show that households are willing to hold foreign government bonds
at an interest rate below that on foreign private debt whenever the open market constraint
(1) is binding. Further, as shown in Appendix A.1.1, the consumer price index Pt is given
by
Pt =
[(λt + µt)R
m
t ]
η (λt + ψH,t)1−η
c−σt
P ηF,tP
1−η
H,t , (19)
where PF,t is the price of foreign goods in terms of the domestic currency. This implies
that the cash distortion influences the price index. The reason is that the households take
into account the cash credit friction into their optimal choice of consumption goods.
2.2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms indexed with j ∈ [0, 1]. Firms
rent labor at the nominal wage Ptwt and produce a differentiated good using a linear
technology,
yH,t (j) = nt (j) .
Cost minimization implies that marginal cost in real (PPI) terms, mct, are constant across
firms and given by
mct = wt
Pt
PH,t
. (20)
Firms produce varieties which are aggregated to a final good by competitive retailers
according to
yH,t =
[∫ 1
0
y
ε−1
ε
H,t (j)dj
] ε
ε−1
,
so that firms face the demand constraint yH,t (j) = (PH,t(j)/PH,t)
−ε yH,t. Following Calvo
(1983), every firm reoptimizes its price in a given period with probability φ. Firms who do
not reoptimize prices are assumed to increase prices with the steady state PPI inflation
rate πH , as in Ascari (2004). Denoting with Zt the price of firms which reoptimize their
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price in period t, optimal forward looking price setting is given by
Zt =
ε
ε− 1
∑
s (φβ)
s uc,t+syH,t+sP
ε
H,t+smct+s∑
s (φβ)
s uc,t+syH,t+sP
ε−1
H,t+s
. (21)
The optimal price setting condition can be rewritten recursively as
Z1t = ε/ (ε− 1)uc,tyH,tmct + φβπ
−ε
H Etπ
ε
H,t+1Z
1
t+1, (22)
Z1t =uc,tyH,t + φβπ
1−ε
H Etπ
ε−1
H,t+1Z
2
t+1, (23)
where Z˜t = Zt/PH,t = Z
1
t /Z
2
t . To determine the PPI inflation rate πH,t, I use that the price
index for home goods satisfies PH,tyH,t =
∫ 1
0 PH,t (j) yH,t (j) dj. Using the firms’ demand
constraint, yH,t (j) = (PH,t(j)/PH,t)
−ε yH,t, this yields
1 = (1− φ)
(
Z1t /Z
2
t
)1−ε
+ φπ1−εH π
ε−1
H,t . (24)
Further, the impact of price dispersion on output is given by
yH,t =
nt
st
, (25)
where st =
∫ 1
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)
−ε
dj captures price dispersion and evolves according to
st = (1− φ)
(
Z1t /Z
2
t
)−ε
+ φπ−εH π
ε
H,tst−1, (26)
as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004).
2.2.3 Public sector
The public sector in the home economy has a balanced budget. Thus, seigniorage earnings
on domestic cash holdings are redistributed as a lump sum transfer Ptτ t to domestic
households, so that the public budget constraint reads
Ptτ t =Mt (Rt − 1) .
Further, monetary policy is given by the interest rate rule
Rt = R
(1−ρR)R
ρR
t−1 (πH,t/πH)
wπ(1−ρR) (yH,t/yH)
wy(1−ρR) , (27)
where ρR governs interest rate inertia and wπ (wy) describes the central bank’s reaction
to deviations of producer price inflation (domestic output) from steady state. This rule is
a simplified version of Justiniano and Preston (2010).
2.3 The foreign economy
In modeling the foreign economy, I closely follow Reynard and Schabert (2009). The only
difference is that households import goods from the small economy. However, it is assumed
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that the foreign economy is large compared to the home economy, so that neither the
allocation nor the price system in the small open economy influences the foreign economy.
However, the impact of changes in domestic holdings of foreign government bonds on asset
stocks in the foreign economy is taken into account.
2.3.1 Households
Foreign households consume an aggregate of consumption goods produced in the foreign
and home economies, c∗t = γ
∗
(
c∗F,t
)1−η∗ (
c∗H,t
)η∗
where γ∗ =
[
η∗n
∗
(1− η∗)1−η
∗
]
−1
. As
is standard in the literature, the large open economy is treated as approximately closed,
i.e. I analyze the case of η∗ → 0 so that foreign consumption and the price index are
approximately given by c∗t = c
∗
F,t and P
∗
t = P
∗
F,t. However, the demand function for import
goods is relevant for the small open economy and given by c∗H,t = η
∗
(
PH,t/St
P∗t
)
−1
c∗t . I
assume that foreign households’ discount factor is identical to that applied by households
in the small economy. Foreign households maximize the expected sum of a discounted
stream of instantaneous utilities which are separable in consumption and labor,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (c∗t , n
∗
t ) .
subject to the asset market constraint
M∗F,t−1 +B
∗
F,t−1 + P
∗
t w
∗
tn
∗
t +D
∗
F,t−1 + P
∗
t δ
∗
t + P
∗
t τ
∗
t
≤M∗F,t +
B∗F,t
R∗t
+
D∗F,t
RD∗t
+ P ∗t c
∗
t + (R
m∗
t − 1) I
∗
F,t, (28)
the open market constraint
I∗F,tR
m∗
t ≤ B
∗
F,t−1, (29)
the cash in advance constraint
P ∗t c
∗
t ≤ I
∗
F,t +M
∗
t−1, (30)
and non-negativity conditions M∗F,t ≥ 0 and B
∗
F,t ≥ 0 as well as the no Ponzi game con-
dition lims→∞Et
s∏
i=0
D∗F,t+s/R
D∗
t+i ≥ 0. The first order conditions with respect to working
time, consumption, open market operations and holdings of private as well as government
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debt and money are given by
−
u∗n,t
w∗t
=λ∗t , (31)
u∗c,t=λ
∗
t + ψ
∗
t , (32)
Rm∗t (λ
∗
t + µ
∗
t ) =λ
∗
t + ψ
∗
t , (33)
λ∗t =β
∗Et
λ∗t+1
π∗t+1
RD∗t , (34)
λ∗t =β
∗Et
λ∗t+1 + µ
∗
t+1
π∗t+1
R∗t , (35)
λ∗t =β
∗Et
λ∗t+1 + ψ
∗
t+1
π∗t+1
, (36)
where λ∗t , µ
∗
t and ψ
∗
t are the Lagrange multipliers on the budget, open market and cash
in advance constraints. The complementary slackness conditions are given by
ψ∗t ≥ 0, M
∗
t + I
∗
F,t − P
∗
t c
∗
t ≥ 0, ψ
∗
t
(
M∗t + I
∗
F,t − P
∗
t c
∗
t
)
= 0,
µ∗t ≥ 0, I
∗
F,t −B
∗
F,t−1/R
m∗
t ≥ 0, µ
∗
t
(
I∗F,t −B
∗
F,t−1/R
m∗
t
)
= 0.
Further, the transversality condition, lims→∞Et
s∏
i=0
D∗F,t+s/R
D∗
t+i = 0 has to be satisfied.
2.3.2 Firms
The setup of the firm sector is identical to the home economy: A continuum of firms in-
dexed over k rents labor and produces intermediate goods with a linear technology, given
exogenous and constant total factor productivity A∗. Intermediate goods are aggregated
like in the home economy, y∗t =
[∫ 1
0 (y
∗
t (k))
ε−1
ε dk
] ε
ε−1
, where I assume an identical elas-
ticity of substitution, ε∗ = ε. This yields the following equilibrium conditions
w∗t = mc
∗
tA
∗, (37)
Z1∗t = ε/ (ε− 1)u
∗
c,ty
∗
tmc
∗
t + φ
∗βπ∗−εEtπ
∗ε
t+1Z
1∗
t+1, (38)
Z2∗t = u
∗
c,ty
∗
t + φ
∗βπ∗1−εEtπ
∗ε−1
t+1 Z
2∗
t+1, (39)
1 = (1− φ)
(
Z1∗t /Z
2∗
t
)1−ε
+ φπ∗1−επ∗ε−1t . (40)
As in the home economy, price dispersion is defined as s∗t =
∫ 1
0
(
P∗t (k)
P∗t
)
−ε
dk, so that
aggregate resources are inefficiently employed whenever s∗t > 1. Aggregate production and
price dispersion are given by
y∗t = A
∗n∗t/s
∗
t , (41)
s∗t = (1− φ)
(
Z1∗t /Z
2∗
t
)−ε
+ φs∗t−1π
∗ε
t . (42)
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2.3.3 Public sector
The public sector is identical to that in Reynard and Schabert (2009) with the exception
that I take into account the impact of holdings of foreign government bonds in the home
economy on asset stocks in the foreign economy. Given a constant growth rate of the
volume of Treasury bonds, which evolve according to
BT∗t = ΓB
T∗
t−1, (43)
the Treasury’s budget constraint is given by
BT∗t
R∗t
+ P ∗t τ
m∗
t = B
T∗
t−1 + P
∗
t τ
∗
t , (44)
where P ∗t τ
m∗
t are seigniorage revenues and P
∗
t τ
∗
t lump-sum transfers to households. The
central bank’s bond holdings evolve according to
BCB∗t
R∗t
+ P ∗t τ
m∗
t = B
CB∗
t−1 +R
m∗
t I
∗
t −M
R∗
F,t , (45)
where I∗t = I
∗
F,t+IF,t denotes total injections and M
R∗
F,t +M
R
F,t are repo operations in both
countries. Seigniorage is defined as interest earnings on government bonds held at period
end, P ∗t τ
m∗
t =
BCB∗t
R∗t
−BCB∗t . Thus, the central bank’s bond holdings evolve according to
BCB∗t −B
CB∗
t−1 = R
m
t I
∗
t −M
R∗
F,t −M
R
F,t.
Foreign households’ bond holdings can now be derived residually from B∗F,t = B
T
t −BF,t−
BCBt , which in differences reads
B∗F,t −B
∗
F,t−1 = B
T∗
t −B
T∗
t−1 − (BF,t −BF,t−1)−
(
BCB∗t −B
CB∗
t−1
)
.
Plugging in central bank bond holdings (45) yields
B∗F,t −B
∗
F,t−1 = (Γ− 1)B
T∗
t−1 − (BF,t −BF,t−1)−
(
Rmt I
∗
t −M
R∗
F,t −M
R
F,t
)
. (46)
Monetary policy is assumed to conduct repurchase operations amounting to, MR∗F,t+M
R
F,t =
Ω
(
M∗F,t +MF,t
)
. Further, the foreign policy rate follows an interest rate rule similar to
that in the home economy
Rm∗t = R
m∗(1−ρ)
(
Rm∗t−1
)ρ(π∗t
π∗
)w∗π(1−ρ)(y∗t
y∗
)wy(1−ρR)
exp(ε∗t )
ρ, (47)
where ε∗t is independently identically distributed with Et−1ε
∗
t = 0. This closes the descrip-
tion of the foreign economy.
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2.4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium markets clear, i.e. nt =
∫ 1
0 nt(j)dj, yH,t = cH,t + c
∗
H,t, and for the foreign
economy n∗t =
∫ 1
0 n
∗
t (k)dk and y
∗
t = c
∗
F,t = c
∗
t because the home economy’s imports cF,t
are considered quantitatively negligible for the foreign economy. Further, private debt
in both economies is in zero net supply, so that DF,t = −D
∗
F,t and Dt = 0, because
foreign households do not invest into home private debt. Throughout, I assume that
the central banks in both countries set their instruments so that the cash in advance
constraints (3), (4) and (30) bind (ψH,t, ψF,t, ψ
∗
t > 0). I further assume that the share
of repurchase agreements in money holdings is identical in both economies, so that the
amounts of bonds repurchased by home and foreign households are given by MRF,t = ΩMF,t
and MR∗F,t = ΩM
∗
F,t. Therefore, home households’ holdings of foreign money are given by
MF,t=MF,t−1 + IF,t − P
∗
F,tcF,t + PH,tc
∗
H,t/St −M
R
F,t
=PH,tc
∗
H,t/St −M
R
F,t, (48)
where the second equality uses the binding cash in advance constraint for the home econ-
omy’s imports.11 Further, when (4) binds, households in the small economy hold domestic
currency amounting to
Mt = PH,tcH,t. (49)
Foreign households’ currency holdings are given by M∗F,t = M
∗
F,t−1 + I
∗
F,t − P
∗
F,tc
∗
F,t +
P ∗t w
∗
tn
∗
t + P
∗
t δ
∗
t − M
R∗
F,t . Using that foreign firms distribute their revenues entirely to
foreign households, this simplifies to
M∗F,t =M
∗
F,t−1 + I
∗
F,t −ΩM
∗
F,t. (50)
Capital account and the real exchange rate The evolution of net foreign asset
holdings is given by12
St
BF,t
R∗t
− StBF,t−1 + St
DF,t
RD∗t
− StDF,t−1 + StMF,t − StMF,t−1 (51)
=PH,tc
∗
H,t − StP
∗
F,tcF,t − StIF,t (R
m∗
t − 1) .
Thus, the foreign country receives interest payments from home households’ participation
in open market operations. Except for this, the capital account is standard: The change
in net foreign asset holdings of domestic households equals the current account, which
11The reason why exports appear is that they are paid for in foreign currency. Thus, households in the
small open economy receive a share of dividends and wages in foreign currency. This share is given by
PH,tc
∗
H,t/St. The remaining amount Ptwtnt + Ptδt − PH,tc
∗
H,t is received in domestic currency.
12This is derived from the households’ budget constraint, using that home firms distribute all revenues
as dividends and wages to home households, and applying the public sector’s budget constraint (44).
14
consists of interest rate payments and the trade balance. Further, (19) can be rewritten
by using the law of one price and the assumption of a large foreign economy, which implies
that PF,t = StP
∗
F,t = StP
∗
t . The real exchange rate is defined as
qt =
StP
∗
t
Pt
=
PF,t
Pt
. (52)
Using this, (19) can be rewritten as
PH,t
Pt
= Φ
1
η−1
t q
η
η−1
t , which in differences reads
πt = πH,t
(
Φt
Φt−1
) 1
1−η
(
qt
qt−1
) η
1−η
, (53)
where Φt =
[(λt+µt)R
m
t ]
η(λt+ψH,t)
1−η
c−σt
.
Binding cash and open market constraints With the exception of section 3.1, I
only consider equilibria where the open market constraints in both economies bind. In
steady state, this is guaranteed by Rm∗ < π
∗
β∗ .
13 This implies that money injections are
given by households’ holdings of foreign government bonds,
IF,t=
BF,t−1
Rm∗t
, (54)
I∗F,t=
B∗F,t−1
Rm∗t
. (55)
Further, binding open market constraints in both economies imply that total injections are
given by I∗t =
B∗
F,t−1
+BF,t−1
Rm∗t
, so that foreign households’ bond holdings evolve according to
B∗F,t = (Γ− 1)B
T∗
t−1 −BF,t +ΩM
∗
F,t +ΩMF,t. (56)
A rational expectations equilibrium is a set of sequences {ct, cF,t, cH,t, nt, PH,t, Pt,Mt, St, qt,
MF,t, IF,t, DF,t, BF,t, wt, λt, ψH,t, ψF,t, µt, yH,t,mct, Z
1
t , Z
2
t , st, Rt, c
∗
t , c
∗
H,t, n
∗
t , P
∗
t , λ
∗
t , ψ
∗
t , µ
∗
t ,
M∗F,t, I
∗
F,t, B
∗
F,t, B
T∗
t , R
m∗
t , R
D∗
t , R
∗
t , w
∗
t ,mc
∗
t , y
∗
t , Z
1∗
t , Z
2∗
t , s
∗
t
}
∞
t=0
satisfying the households’
and firms’ first order conditions including the transversality conditions, the open market
constraints (1) and (2), binding cash in advance constraints (3), (4) and (5), the house-
holds’ holdings of foreign and home currency and foreign bonds, (48), (50) and (46), the
capital account (51), the definition of the real exchange rate (52) and the home CPI (53)
and PPI (24), aggregate production yH,t = cH,t + c
∗
H,t = nt/st and y
∗
t = c
∗
t = A
∗n∗t /s
∗
t
with price dispersion (26) and (42), export demand c∗H,t = η
∗P ∗t St/PH,tc
∗
t and monetary
policy rules (27) and (47) as well as the supply of foreign government bonds (43) for given
A∗ and initial values MF,−1,M
∗
F,−1 ≥ 0, BF,−1, B
∗
F,−1, B
T∗
−1 > 0 and DF,−1 = −D
∗
F,−1, and
P−1, PH,−1, P
∗
−1, S−1 > 0. A summary of equilibrium conditions for the case of binding
13For a derivation of this property, see Appendix A.3.
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open market constraints is given in Appendix A.2.
3 Uncovered interest rate parity
In this section, I derive the uncovered interest rate parity conditions implied by the model
economy. When open market constraints bind, the model gives rise to a modified UIP
condition, which contains a liquidity premium. This condition collapses to the standard
UIP condition when open market constraints do not bind.
3.1 A standard UIP condition
Assume that µt = µ
∗
t = 0 so that the open market constraints in both economies, (1)
and (2), do not bind. In steady state, this is the case if foreign monetary policy sets
the long-run policy rate to Rm∗ = π∗/β∗. The foreign households’ first order conditions
(34)-(35) imply that in this case, there is no spread between interest rates on private
and government debt, which must then equal the policy rate, RD∗t = R
∗
t = R
m∗
t . Thus,
there are no liquidity premia when open market constraints do not bind. Consider the
home households’ first order conditions for investment in domestic private debt and foreign
government bonds, (14) and (16). Using the definition of the real exchange rate (52) and
combining the two equations yields
Et
St+1
St
=
Rt
R∗t
+Υt, (57)
using that the Inada conditions imply λt > 0 ∀t and where terms of order higher than one
are summarized in Υt =
1
R∗tEtλt+1Etπ
−1
t+1
{
RtCov
(
λt+1, π
−1
t+1
)
−
R∗t
St
Cov
(
λt+1St+1, π
−1
t+1
)
−
R∗t
St
Etλt+1Cov (λt+1, St+1)
}
. I am not interested in effects of order two and above and
thus ignore covariance terms in the analysis in this and the following sections. Equation
(57) is a standard uncovered interest rate parity condition, which can be found in many
small open economy models, such as Galí and Monacelli (2005). It requires the expected
nominal depreciation to be equal to the interest rate difference between the home and
foreign economies.
3.2 A modified UIP condition
When open market constraints bind, µt, µ
∗
t > 0, foreign government bonds will pay a
lower interest rate compared to foreign private debt. The reason is that foreign government
bonds can be exchanged into cash, which households in the home economy need to purchase
internationally traded goods. Combining the domestic households’ optimality conditions
for investment into domestic and foreign private debt (14) and (15) and using that λt > 0
yields
Et
St+1
St
=
Rt
RD∗t
+Υ′t, (58)
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where Υ′t =
1
RD∗t Etλt+1Etπ
−1
t+1
{
RtCov
(
λt+1, π
−1
t+1
)
−
RD∗t
St
[
Cov
(
λt+1St+1, π
−1
t+1
)
+Etπ
−1
t+1Cov (λt+1, St+1)
]}
summarizes terms of order two and higher. Thus, a standard
UIP condition holds with respect to the interest rate difference in terms of the foreign debt
rate RD∗t . This rate is usually not observable. To obtain a UIP condition in the observable
interest rate difference of home to foreign government bonds, I use the domestic households’
optimality condition for investment into foreign government bonds, (16). Combining this
with (15) gives
RtEt
λt+1
πt+1
=
R∗t
St
EtSt+1
θt+1
πt+1
,
which can be written in the form of a modified UIP condition
Et
St+1
St
=
Rt
R∗t θt
+Υ′′t , (59)
where θt =
(
1 +Et
µt+1
λt+1
)
and with higher order terms summarized inΥ′′t =
1
R∗t θtEtλt+1Etπ
−1
t+1[
RtCov
(
λt+1, π
−1
t+1
)
−
R∗t
St
Cov
(
π−1t+1, St+1θt+1
)
−
R∗t
St
Etπ
−1
t+1Cov (St+1, θt+1)
]
.Thus, the in-
terest rate difference between home and foreign government bonds is not the only determi-
nant of exchange rate behavior. When the open market constraint in the home economy
binds, µt > 0, the term θt exceeds unity, reflecting the liquidity value of foreign government
bonds. (58) and (59) imply that
θt =
RD∗t
R∗t
(
1 +Υ′′′t
)
, (60)
where Υ′′′t = (Υ
′
t −Υ
′′
t ) summarizes higher order terms. The interest rate spread R
D∗
t /R
∗
t
represents the opportunity cost of holding foreign government bonds, which in equilibrium,
up to first order, will be equal to the premium θt. This premium captures the marginal
liquidity value of holding foreign government bonds and will thus be called a liquidity
premium.
4 Monetary policy and exchange rates
The goal of this section is to analyze the response of the exchange rate to a foreign monetary
policy shock when open market constraints bind, so that a non-standard UIP condition
holds. Further, I analyze a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium conditions around
the model’s steady state, which is derived in Appendix A.3. Let xˆt = 100 log(xt/x) denote
the percentage deviation of xt from its steady state x. The linearized version of (59) then
reads
EtSˆt+1 − Sˆt = Rˆt − Rˆ
∗
t − θˆt, (61)
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where θˆt = Rˆ
D∗
t − Rˆ
∗
t . The liquidity premium can be reexpressed as a function of the
policy rate using that (35) and (36) imply Rˆ∗t = EtRˆ
m∗
t+1, so that
θˆt = Rˆ
D∗
t −EtRˆ
m∗
t+1. (62)
Because a closed form solution for the general model version cannot be derived, I analyze
a simplified model version.
4.1 Flexible prices
Assume flexible prices in the foreign economy, so that (37) becomes w∗t = A
∗ and (38)-(40)
are redundant. Further, assume a utility function of the form u (c∗t , n
∗
t ) = log c
∗
t−χ
∗n∗t and
an exogenous instrument rule for the foreign policy rate, Rm∗t = (R
m∗)1−ρ
∗ (
Rm∗t−1
)ρ∗
exp ε∗t .
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Moreover, nominal growth of foreign government debt is given by Γ∗ = 1, and the central
bank targets zero steady state inflation, π∗ = 1.15 Further, I assume that the impact of
home households’ holdings of foreign government bonds on foreign households’ holdings
B∗F,t is negligible, so that (56) collapses to B
∗
F,t = ΩM
∗
F,t. This implies that the foreign
allocation and price system are independent from the home economy.
It can be shown that a shock to the foreign policy rate Rm∗t leads to an increase in
the interest rate on foreign government debt which is more than compensated by a decline
in the liquidity premium. Intuitively, the rising foreign policy rate makes it more costly
to exchange government bonds for cash, so that the marginal liquidity value of holding
foreign government bonds declines. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider the simplified model version. A foreign monetary policy shock
then leads to a decline in the liquidity premium which is larger than the rise in the interest
rate on foreign government bonds, θˆt > Rˆ
∗
t .
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
I now turn to exchange rate dynamics. Proposition 1 shows that in response to a contrac-
tionary foreign policy shock, the liquidity premium declines and overcompensates the rise
in the government bond interest rate. Thus, at a constant home interest rate, the expected
rate of depreciation EtSˆt+1 − Sˆt increases in order to compensate for the lower marginal
benefit of investing into foreign government bonds. This result is in stark contrast to
14Note that the model does not imply equilibrium indeterminacy under an interest rate peg, which would
be the case in a standard small open economy model. The reason is that the supply of collateral determines
the price level path in the long run and thus prevents indeterminacy.
15Existence of a steady state then requires a long-run policy rate of Rm∗ = 1 because a positive policy
rate in the steady state would imply that the central bank in every period acquires a share of households’
bond holdings. With a constant supply of bonds, this would imply that foreign households’ holdings of
foreign government bonds, and thus foreign consumption, would converge to zero. Note that in principle,
the central bank could also target an inflation rate different from zero, as long as π > β∗ so that the cash
constraints in both economies continue to bind. For a steady state to exist, the policy rate then must
satisfy Rm∗ = (Ω/(Ωπ∗ + π∗ − 1)). For details, see Appendix A.3.2.
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standard UIP conditions, which predict that a rise in the foreign interest rate (which in a
standard model is identical to the foreign policy rate) leads to a decline in the expected
rate of depreciation. This result is summarized in the following:
Corollary 2 Consider the effect of a rise in the foreign policy rate on exchange rates
given a constant home interest rate in the simplified model version. When the open market
constraints do not bind, a rise in R∗t leads to a decline in the expected rate of depreciation
of the home currency, EtSˆt+1− Sˆt < 0. Under binding open market constraints, a positive
shock to the foreign policy rate implies that the expected rate of depreciation is positive,
EtSˆt+1 − Sˆt > 0.
Thus, endogenous movements in the liquidity premium can alter exchange rate dynamics
to an extent that the sign of the exchange rate change can switch. This is in line with the
empirical evidence by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Scholl and Uhlig (2008), who
find that a foreign monetary shock lets the home currency depreciate for several quarters.
Because it is difficult to derive analytical results for the full version of the model, I analyze
a calibrated version in the next section.
4.2 Sticky prices
This section analyzes a calibrated version of the model economy with sticky prices in
both economies, using a first-order approximation to the model’s equilibrium conditions
around the steady state.16 Foreign monetary policy is assumed to set the long-run policy
rate according to Rm∗ < π
∗
β and targets long-run inflation π
∗ > β∗ , so that the the open
market and cash constraints in the home and the foreign economy bind in steady state
(see Appendix A.3). I analyze the model in a local neighborhood of the steady state where
shocks are sufficiently small so that open market and cash constraints continue to bind.
Households in both economies are assumed to maximize utility functions of the form
u (ct, nt) =
c1−σt − 1
1− σ
− χ
n1+ωt
1 + ω
, (63)
u (c∗t , n
∗
t ) =
c∗1−σ
∗
t − 1
1− σ∗
− χ∗
n∗1+ω
∗
t
1 + ω∗
. (64)
4.2.1 Calibration
Table 1 summarizes the calibration. With respect to the intertemporal substitution elas-
ticity of consumption goods and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, I choose σ = σ∗ = 1.5
and ω = ω∗ = 1, which I consider a reasonable trade-off between diverging estimates re-
sulting from microeconomic and macroeconomic data: Card (1994) suggests a range of 0.2
to 0.5 for the Frisch elasticity while Smets and Wouters (2007) estimate ω = 1.92. With
respect to the intertemporal substitutability of consumption, Barsky, Kimball, Juster,
16The full set of (non-linearized) equilibrium conditions can be found in Appendix A.2.
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Discount Factor β = β∗ = 0.9889
Inverse of intertemporal substitution elasticity σ = σ∗ = 1.5
Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply ω = ω∗ = 1
Openness home economy η = 0.27
Openness foreign economy η∗ = 0.01
Subst. elasticity home and foreign varieties ε = ε∗ = 10
Calvo price stickiness φ = 0.85; φ∗ = 0.75
Taylor rule coefficients - Inflation wπ = w
∗
π = 2
Taylor rule coefficients - Output wy = 0.2, w
∗
y = 0.1
Interest rate inertia ρ = 0.88; ρ∗ = 0.80
Share of repos to outright purchases Ω = 1.5
Steady state inflation Γ = 1.00575 = π∗ = π
Steady state foreign policy rate Rm∗ = 1.0105
Steady state labor supply n = n∗ = 0.33
Foreign labor productivity A∗ = 10
Home net foreign asset position relative
to imports (steady steady)
bF+dF+mF
cF
= −1
Table 1: Paramater calibration
and Shapiro (1997) estimate an elasticity of 0.18 using micro data, implying a value of
around 5 for σ. Macroeconomic data generally implies lower estimates, e.g. Smets and
Wouters (2007) estimate σ = 1.39. I further choose χ and χ∗ to calibrate working time
in both economies to n = n∗ = 0.33. Foreign labor productivity is set to A∗ = 10, so
that the relative size of the economies matches the ratio of Canadian to U.S. gross do-
mestic product. I follow Justiniano and Preston’s (2010) estimate of openness and price
stickiness for Canada, η = 0.27 and φ = 0.85. With respect to the foreign economy, I
choose φ∗ = 0.75 as a compromise between the estimates of Smets and Wouters (2007),
Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) and Justiniano and Preston (2010) for the United States,
which range between 0.65 and 0.90. Monetary policy in both countries sets the interest
rate according to a Taylor rule, where home policy is calibrated to wπ = 2, wy = 0.2 and
ρ = 0.88, as estimated by Justiniano and Preston (2010) for the Canadian economy. In
the foreign economy, monetary policy is characterized by w∗π = 2, w
∗
y = 0.1 and ρ
∗ = 0.80,
which is in line with Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), who
estimate models with Bayesian techniques using U.S. data. The parameter Ω is chosen to
match the observed share of reserves supplied in repurchase operations to total reserves,
as in Reynard and Schabert (2009). The long-run inflation rate and the policy rate in
the foreign economy are set to the 20-year averages of U.S. consumer price inflation and,
respectively, the Federal Funds rate, π∗ = 1.00575 and Rm∗ = 1.0105. The home central
bank is assumed to adopt an identical long-run inflation target, π = π∗. The discount fac-
tor is assumed to be equal across both countries and calibrated to the liquidity premium,
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i.e. the spread between the debt rate RD∗ and the rate on foreign government bonds R∗.
The debt rate is the interest rate on a safe but illiquid bond. I follow Canzoneri, Cumby,
and Diba (2007) and calibrate the spread to 65 basis points, which equals the difference
between the interest rate faced by high-quality (AAA) borrowers and the interest rate on
3 months Treasury bills. Because there is no asset without any liquidity value, it is likely
that this figure underestimates the true liquidity premium. Thus, the discount factor is
set to β = πRm+65·10−4 = 0.9889. Further, the home economy is assumed to be a net debtor
in steady state, with debt equivalent to 100% of the home country’s quarterly imports,
bF+dF+mF
cF
= −1. This is in line with the ratio of Canadian foreign debt to average imports
over the past 20 years and leads to a ratio of debt to domestic absorption of 9%, as in
Bouakez and Rebei (2008).17
4.2.2 Responses to a shock to the foreign policy rate
This section analyzes the impact of a foreign monetary policy shock. Figure 1 shows the
impact of a 12.5 basis point innovation to Rm∗t on the foreign economy. All variables are in
per cent deviations from steady state, ẑt = 100 [log(zt)− log(z)] , except for interest rates
and inflation, which are given in absolute deviations, Rˆ∗t = 100 ∗ (R
∗
t −R
∗) . The increase
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Figure 1: Responses to a foreign monetary policy shock in the foreign economy
17Data on imports and net foreign debt were taken from Statistics Canada, Publications 67-202-X and
13-019-X.
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in the foreign policy rate induces a decline in foreign consumption and a reduction in
inflation in the foreign economy. Consumption responds in a hump-shaped way because a
rising policy rate increases seigniorage and thus reduces households’ bond holdings, which
implies that consumption declines with a lag. Further, the increase in the policy rate
reduces the liquidity value of government bonds, so that the interest rate on these rises.
The nominal interest rate on private debt declines because inflation falls.
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Figure 2: Responses to a foreign monetary policy shock in the home economy
Figure 2 shows the responses of the home economy. The foreign interest rate shock
affects the home economy through different channels. First, it renders imports more
expensive because foreign currency becomes more costly. Further, the decline in foreign
consumption reduces export demand and implies that the home currency devalues both in
nominal and real terms. This makes imports even more expensive for domestic households,
who reduce consumption and increase worked hours, so that production rises. Turning
attention to the exchange rate, a pattern different from that implied by standard models is
observed: The nominal exchange rate depreciates on impact, and continues to depreciate
until it peaks in the seventh quarter, consistent with Corollary 2. Thus, the model predicts
delayed overshooting in line with the analysis by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Scholl
and Uhlig (2008). The driving force behind delayed overshooting is the liquidity premium.
A rising foreign policy rate implies that government bonds become less liquid, so that the
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liquidity premium declines. As in Proposition 1, the decline in the liquidity premium
exceeds the increase in the foreign government bond interest rate.
With respect to the real exchange rate, the model does not predict delayed overshoot-
ing: In real terms, the domestic currency depreciates on impact, peaks in the shock period
and then appreciates gradually back toward its steady state. The reason for the divergence
between nominal and real exchange rates is the persistent decline in foreign inflation, which
implies that the real rate of appreciation is negative while the rate of nominal depreciation
is positive in the shock period. In line with the high observed correlation between real
and nominal exchange rates, the VAR evidence quoted above predicts delayed overshoot-
ing for both the nominal and the real exchange rate. Although the key currency model
does not predict delayed overshooting for the real exchange rate, the liquidity premium
increases the rate of real appreciation, so that real exchange rate movements are closer to
the pattern observed by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Scholl and Uhlig (2008), as
predicted by standard UIP.
4.2.3 Comparing exchange rate dynamics to standard UIP
This section compares exchange rate dynamics to those predicted by a standard UIP con-
dition. In principle, the model without binding open market constraints is characterized
by such a standard UIP. However, analyzing the impact of a shock to the foreign policy
rate within the model without binding open market constraints would imply that, apart
from the different UIP condition, general equilibrium effects would affect exchange rate
movements. For instance, the reaction of inflation in the foreign economy would be dif-
ferent due to differences in monetary transmission. Thus, I construct a counterfactual
scenario which shows how exchange rates would behave under a standard UIP condi-
tion, all other things equal.18 Denoting ex ante real interest rates as rˆt = Rˆt − Etπˆt+1
and rˆ∗t = Rˆ
∗
t − Etπˆ
∗
t+1, time series for the expected nominal and real exchange rates are
constructed from standard UIP conditions
EtSˆt+1 − Sˆt= Rˆt − Rˆ
∗
t ,
Etqˆt+1 − qˆt= rˆt − rˆ
∗
t ,
where the series for Rˆt − Rˆ
∗
t and rˆt − rˆ
∗
t are given by the responses to a foreign policy
rate shock in the model with liquidity premia. These are compared to the exchange
rate movements which result when taking into account the liquidity premium, which are
identical to those presented in Figure 2. Figure 3 shows the results of this analysis.
18"All other things" also refers to the long-run equilibrium values for the nominal and real exchange rates.
In other words, I assume that in the counterfactual scenario, the nominal and real exchange rates converge
to long-run equilibrium values identical to those in the model with liquidity premia. This assumption is
required to compute the impact response of the exchange rates in the counterfactual scenario.
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Figure 3: Comparison of exchange rate dynamics under standard and modified UIP
Under a conventional UIP, a rise in the foreign interest rate leads to an impact nominal
depreciation, followed by a persistent appreciation. This is Dornbusch’s (1976) famous
"overshooting" result: The nominal exchange rate jumps on impact after a monetary
shock and overshoots its new long-run equilibrium value. Given that the decline in the
nominal interest rate on foreign government bonds under sticky prices implies a decline
in the real interest rate, the standard UIP condition predicts overshooting for the real
exchange rate as well.
Taking into account movements of the liquidity premium fundamentally affects ex-
change rate dynamics: An increase in the foreign policy rate reduces the liquidity pre-
mium and leads to an impact depreciation of the domestic currency, as before. However,
because the liquidity premium falls more strongly than the interest rate difference for the
first seven quarters, in nominal terms the domestic currency continues to depreciate (for
seven quarters). Thus, the liquidity premium reverses the sign of the expected rate of
nominal depreciation, compared to a standard UIP. Apart from the pattern of the re-
sponse, also the timing of the peak, which occurs in the seventh quarter is in line with
the estimates by Scholl and Uhlig (2008), who find that the median of the peak in the
exchange rates of the U.S. dollar to the currencies of Germany, the U.K., and Japan occurs
after 17-26 months.
The response of the real exchange rate under the modified UIP condition depends on
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real interest rates in both countries and the liquidity premium. The foreign monetary
policy shock leads to a persistent decline in foreign inflation, which implies that the for-
eign real interest rate (on government bonds) increases more strongly than its nominal
counterpart. Figure 4 shows that this leads to a decline in the real interest rate difference
which slightly exceeds the decline in the liquidity premium, so that the real exchange
rate will appreciate and return toward its steady state after its peak in the first period.
Thus, the pattern of the real exchange rate’s response to a foreign monetary policy shock
under the modified UIP condition is similar to standard UIP. However, the decline in the
liquidity premium moderates the appreciation after the peak, so that the predictions of
the modified UIP condition become closer to the empirical evidence, which finds delayed
overshooting for nominal and real exchange rates.
5 Conclusion
This paper asks if the leading role of the U.S. dollar in international trade can explain ob-
served deviations from uncovered interest rate parity, focusing on the impact of monetary
policy shocks on exchange rates. It derives a macroeconomic model in which U.S. govern-
ment bonds trade at a liquidity premium because they facilitate access to key currency
liquidity. This liquidity premium enters the UIP condition and can explain delayed over-
shooting of the nominal (but not the real) exchange rate: In response to a contractionary
U.S. monetary policy shock, the premium falls (reflecting the higher cost of obtaining
liquidity) and overcompensates the rise in the interest rate on government bonds.
Thus, the paper contributes to consumption based asset pricing theory by demonstrat-
ing that liquidity premia can improve exchange rate predictions. In a similar vein, Reynard
and Schabert (2009) show that they can align model-implied and observed interest rates.
Because asset pricing conditions are an important determinant of the equilibrium alloca-
tion in macroeconomic models, this can crucially affect the transmission of shocks. Further,
Justiniano and Preston (2010) argue that the empirical failure of UIP is at the root of the
deficits of estimated New Keynesian models in explaining the international transmission
of shocks. Therefore, it would be interesting to analyze if a full-fledged model incorpo-
rating the effects of liquidity premia on asset prices and the macroeconomic allocation
can perform better in this respect. Further, the model contains a channel through which
contagion, i.e. financial crises spreading across seemingly unrelated countries, can be ex-
plained: When investors’ liquidity demand changes, this affects liquidity premia and has
an effect on exchange rates and import demand in all countries that use the key currency
in international transactions.
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A Appendix
The appendix contains the derivation of equilibrium conditions of the home economy as
well as summaries of home and foreign equilibrium conditions for the case of binding open
market constraints, a derivation of the steady states and a proof of proposition 1.
A.1 Home economy equilibrium conditions
A.1.1 Price index and households’ goods demand
Households’ goods demand First, I rewrite (10) by using (11) and
(
cF,t
cH,t
)1−η
= ctcF,tγ
to obtain
cF,t =
ηuc,t
(λt + µt)R
m
t qt
ct. (65)
Similarly, rewriting (9) by using
(
cF,t
cH,t
)η
= ctcH,tγ implies
cH,t =
(1− η)uc,t(
λt + ψH,t
) PH,t
Pt
ct. (66)
Using (65) and (66) in the definition of the price index yields
Ptct = PH,tcH,t + PF,tcF,t
⇐⇒
1 = (1− η)
uc,t
λt + ψH,t
+ η
uc,t
(λt + µt)R
m
t
, (67)
which characterizes the optimal labor leisure trade-off given that domestic and imported
goods are subject to cash credit frictions.
Derivation of the price index Using cH,t =
(
ct
γcη
F,t
) 1
1−η
to cancel out cH,t in (66),
solving for cF,t and combining this with (65) yields[
(1− η)uc,t(
λt + ψH,t
)
PH,t/Pt
]η−1
η
ctγ
−1
η =
ηuc,t
(λt + µt)R
m
t PF,t/Pt
ct,
where γ1/η = η−η/η (1− η)
η−1
η . Solving for the price level yields
Pt =
[(λt + µt)R
m
t ]
η (λt + ψH,t)1−η
uc,t
P ηF,tP
1−η
H,t . (68)
Thus, the price index takes into account that households’ consumption choice is influenced
by the cash credit friction. For simplicity, define Φt =
[(λt+µt)R
m∗
t ]
η(λt+ψH,t)
1−η
uc,t
which
measures the extent of the cash-credit friction. Introducing the real exchange rate qt =
StP∗t
Pt
=
PF,t
Pt
and using zt = PH,t/PF,t =
PH,t
StP∗t
= q−1t
PH,t
Pt
, which implies Φt
(
PH,t
PF,t
)1−η
=
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Pt
PF,t
, I can rewrite (68) as
PH,t
Pt
= Φ
1
η−1
t q
η
η−1
t , which in differences reads
πt = πH,t
(
Φt
Φt−1
) 1
1−η
(
qt
qt−1
) η
1−η
. (69)
A.2 Equilibrium conditions when open market constraints bind
A.2.1 Home economy
The representative household’s first order conditions can be summarized by
λtwt=−un,t, (70)
1= (1− η)
uc,t
λt + ψH,t
+ η
uc,t
(λt + µt)R
m
t
, (71)
cF,t=
ηuc,t
(λt + µt)R
m∗
t qt
ct, (72)
cH,t=
(1− η)uc,t(
λt + ψH,t
)
Φ
1
η−1
t q
η
η−1
t
ct, (73)
λt= βEt
λt+1Rt
πt+1
, (74)
λtqt= βEtqt+1
λt+1 + µt+1
π∗t+1
R∗t , (75)
Rt
Etπt+1
=Et
qt+1
qt
RD∗t
π∗t+1
, (76)
ψH,t= λt (Rt − 1) , (77)
πH,t= πt
(
Φt
Φt−1
) 1
η−1
(
qt
qt−1
) η
η−1
, (78)
where Φt =
[(λt+µt)R
m∗
t ]
η(λt+ψH,t)
1−η
uc,t
. The binding cash and open market constraints read
cF,t=
bF,t−1
Rm∗t π
∗
t
+
mF,t−1
π∗t
, (79)
mF,t=
1
1 + Ω
η∗c∗t , (80)
mt=Φ
1
η−1
t q
η
η−1
t cH,t, (81)
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where mF,t = MF,t/P
∗
t , bF,t = BF,t/P
∗
t and mt = Mt/Pt denote real money and bond
holdings. The firms’ block of first order conditions is given by
mct = wtΦ
1
1−η
t q
η
1−η
t , (82)
Z1t = uc,tyH,tmct + φβπ
−ε
H Etπ
ε
H,t+1Z
1
t+1, (83)
Z2t = uc,tyH,t + φβπ
1−ε
H Etπ
ε−1
H,t+1Z
2
t+1, (84)
1 = (1− φ)
(
Z1t /Z
2
t
)1−ε
+ φπ1−εH π
ε−1
H,t . (85)
The final block of equilibrium conditions contains, among others, the resource constraint,
the production function including price dispersion and the evolution of foreign debt,
yH,t= cH,t + c
∗
H,t, (86)
yH,t=n
α
t /st, (87)
st= (1− φ)
(
Z1t /Z
2
t
)−ε
+ φπ−εH π
ε
H,tst−1, (88)
Φ
1
η−1
t q
1
η−1
t c
∗
H,t − cF,t=
bF,t
R∗t
−
bF,t−1
Rm∗t π
∗
t
+
dF,t
RD∗t
−
dF,t−1
π∗t
+mF,t −
mF,t−1
π∗t
,
qt
qt−1
=
St
St−1
π∗t
πt
, (89)
c∗H,t= q
1
1−η
t Φ
1
1−η
t η
∗c∗t , (90)
where dF,t = DF,t/P
∗
t denotes real holdings of foreign private debt. Monetary policy
follows a Taylor rule.
Rt = R
(1−ρR)R
ρR
t−1 (πH,t/πH)
wπ(1−ρR) (yH,t/yH)
wy(1−ρR) , (91)
where R = π/β is the steady state interest rate in the home economy.
A.2.2 Foreign economy
When cash and open market constraints bind, the foreign economy can be described by
the behavior of households,
−u∗n,t
w∗t
=β∗Et
u∗c,t+1
πt+1∗
, (92)
Et
u∗c,t+1
π∗t+1
=R∗tEt
u∗c,t+1
π∗t+1R
m∗
t+1
, (93)
u∗n,t
w∗t
=βRD∗t
un,t+1∗
w∗t+1π
∗
t+1
, (94)
c∗t =(1 + Ω)m
∗
F,t, (95)
m∗F,t(1 + Ω)=
m∗F,t−1
π∗t
+
b∗F,t−1/π
∗
t
Rm∗t
, (96)
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firms,
w∗t = mc
∗
tA
∗, (97)
Z1∗t = ε/ (ε− 1)u
∗
c,ty
∗
tmc
∗
t + φ
∗βπ∗−εEtπ
∗ε
t+1Z
1∗
t+1, (98)
Z2∗t = u
∗
c,ty
∗
t + φ
∗βπ∗1−εEtπ
∗ε−1
t+1 Z
2∗
t+1, (99)
1 = (1− φ)
(
Z1∗t /Z
2∗
t
)1−ε
+ φπ∗1−επ∗ε−1t , (100)
the public sector,
b∗F,t = (Γ− 1) b
T∗
t−1/π
∗
t − bF,t +m
R∗
F,t, (101)
bT∗t = Γb
T∗
t−1/π
∗
t , (102)
Rm∗t = R
m∗(1−ρ)
(
Rm∗t−1
)ρ
(π∗t/π
∗)w
∗
π(1−ρ) (y∗t /y
∗)wy(1−ρR) exp(ε∗t )
ρ, (103)
and aggregate resources,
y∗t = c
∗
t , (104)
y∗t = A
∗n∗t /s
∗
t , (105)
s∗t = (1− φ
∗)
(
Z1∗t /Z
2∗
t
)−ε
+ φ∗s∗t−1π
∗ε
t , (106)
where m∗F,t = M
∗
F,t/P
∗
t and b
∗
F,t = B
∗
F,t/P
∗
t denote real money and bond holdings, A
∗ is
exogenous labor productivity and bT∗t = B
T∗
t /P
∗
t denotes the real stock of foreign bonds
in circulation.
A.3 Steady States under binding open market constraints
This section derives the steady state of the model given binding open market constraints.
This is required for the log-linear approximation used in section 4.2.
A.3.1 Home economy
I use that the utility function is given by (63), which is repeated here for convenience
u (ct, nt) =
c1−σt − 1
1− σ
− χ
n1+ηt
1 + η
.
The first order conditions for price setting imply
Z1 = εε−1
ucyH
1−φβmc, Z
2 = ucyH1−φβ ,
mc = ε−1ε , s =
(
Z1
Z2
)
−ε
= 1.
The steady state inflation rate of home goods, πH , can be set by the central bank through
the interest rate rule. There is no price dispersion in steady state due to indexation
of non-optimized prices to steady state inflation. The domestic Euler rate is given by
R = π/β, and the UIP condition implies identical real interest rates R/π = RD∗/π∗ and
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thus identical discount factors, β = β∗. Further, in steady state CPI inflation equals PPI
inflation, π = πH . Moreover, I assume that the home central bank targets an inflation rate
identical to foreign inflation, π = π∗, so that R = RD∗ and the nominal exchange rate is
constant, St/St−1 = 1 but in its level not determined. Consider the remaining system of
equilibrium conditions,
χ=λwn−ω (107)
λ= c−σ
[
1− η
RD
+
η
RD∗
]
= c−σ/RD (108)
λ= ηq−1c−σ
(
c
cF
)
1
RD∗
(109)
µ=λ
(
RD∗
R∗
− 1
)
(110)
ψF =λ
(
RD∗ − 1
)
(111)
ψH =λ
(
RD − 1
)
(112)
Φ=
λ
c−σ
(
RD∗
)η (
RD
)1−η
= 1 (113)
cF =
bF
Rm∗π∗
+
mF
π∗
(114)
mF =
1
1 + Ω
η∗c∗ (115)
w=Φ
1
η−1 q
η
η−1
ε− 1
ε
(116)
nα=
(
c/cηFγ
) 1
1−η + η∗q
1
1−ηΦ
1
1−η c∗ (117)
bF
R∗
= η∗c∗ − dF
(
1
RD∗
−
1
π∗
)
−mF , (118)
where the last equation uses Rm = R∗ as well as the binding open market constraint.
Observe from the multipliers on the cash in advance constraint (ψF , ψH) and the open
market constraint (µ) that a foreign interest rate policy satisfying Rm∗ < π
∗
β∗ and π
∗ > β∗
as well as a positive domestic interest rate in the long run (π > β) implies that all cash
and open market constraints bind in the long run. Using (115), I can rewrite (118) as
bF + dF
(
R∗
RD∗
−
R∗
π∗
)
= η∗c∗R∗
Ω
1 +Ω
and can solve for bF given a level of total foreign asset holdings relative to imports d¯ =
bF+dF+mF
cF
, which yields
bF =
η∗c∗R∗ Ω1+Ω +
(
d¯cF −
η∗c∗
1+Ω
) (
R∗
π∗ −
R∗
RD∗
)
1 + R
∗
π∗ −
R∗
RD∗
.
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Using (114) to solve for bF yields
cF =B
−1η∗c∗R∗
Ω
1 +Ω
−
η∗c∗
1 + Ω
(
R∗
π∗
−
R∗
RD∗
)
+B−1
(
1 +
R∗
π∗
−
R∗
RD∗
)
Rm∗π∗
mF
π∗
,
where B =
[(
Rm∗π∗ − d¯
) (
R∗
π∗ −
R∗
RD∗
)
+Rm∗π∗
]
. Then, back out dF by using holdings of
foreign private debt by using dF = d¯cF − bF −mF . Further, with (108) and (109), λ can
be eliminated, so that consumption is given by
c = q
(
1 +
RD∗
RD
1− η
η
)
cF .
To obtain q, I use this in (117) to replace c, yielding
nα = q
1
1−η
{[(
1 +
RD∗
RD
1− η
η
)
γ−1
] 1
1−η
cF + η
∗Φ
1
1−η c∗
}
. (119)
Further, I set n = 0.33 and use (107) to back out χ after the other steady state variables
are determined. Thus, (119) can be used to solve for the real exchange rate,
q = nα(1−η)
{[(
1 +
RD∗
RD
1− η
η
)
γ−1
] 1
1−η
cF + η
∗Φ
1
1−η c∗
}η−1
.
Thus, home consumption is given by
c = q
(
1 +
RD∗
RD
1− η
η
)
cF .
With this result at hand, the remaining variables can be backed out, yielding
w = ε−1ε Φ
1
η−1 q
η
η−1 , mF =
η∗c∗
1+Ω ,
bF = cFR
m∗π∗ −mFR
m∗, λ = c
−σ
RD
,
χ = λwn−ω, ψH = λ
(
RD − 1
)
,
ψF = λ
(
RD∗ − 1
)
, µ = λ
(
RD∗
R∗ − 1
)
,
tb = q (η∗c∗ − cF ) , cH =
(
c
cη
F
γ
) 1
1−η
,
c∗H = q
1
1−ηΦ
1
1−η η∗c∗.
A.3.2 Foreign economy
I use that the utility function is given by (64). As shown in Reynard and Schabert (2009),
steady state inflation is determined by the growth rate of short-term government bonds, Γ∗.
The central bank is assumed to adjust its long-run inflation target to this value, π∗ = Γ∗.
The households’ first order conditions imply that the steady state interest rate on private
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debt is given by RD∗ = π
∗
β∗ . Further, using the first order conditions for money holdings
and consumption yields
µ∗ = c
∗
−σ
(
1
Rm∗
−
1
RD∗
)
.
Thus, the open market constraint binds in steady state when policy sets Rm∗ < RD∗ = π
∗
β .
Further, the multiplier on the cash in advance constraint is given by ψ∗ = Rm∗η∗ +
λ∗ (Rm∗ − 1) where λ∗ = β∗ c
∗−σ
π∗ implies that ψ
∗ = c∗−σ
[
1− β
∗
π∗
]
. Thus, the cash in
advance constraint binds whenever π∗ > β∗, which is assumed to be fulfilled throughout
the paper. Further, attention is restricted to a small neighborhood of the steady state,
where the open market and cash in advance constraints bind. The steady state can be
derived analytically from the remaining equilibrium conditions. Using the households’ and
firms’ first order conditions (as well as the aggregate resource constraint c∗ = n
∗
s∗ ) gives
n∗ =
[
ε−1
ε
A∗1−σβ∗
χ∗π∗
] 1
ω∗+σ∗
, w∗ = A∗mc∗,
c∗ = n
∗
s∗ , Z
1∗ = εε−1
c
∗
−σy∗
1−φβ mc
∗,
RD∗ = π
∗
β∗ , Z
2∗ =
c
∗
−σy∗
H
1−φβ ,
R∗ = Rm∗, Z1∗/Z2∗ = 1 =⇒mc∗ = ε−1ε ,
s∗ =
(
Z1∗/Z2∗
)
−ε
= 1.
Further, the cash-in-advance constraint and the households’ holdings of money and bonds
can be used to obtain the steady state values for m, b and bT ,
m∗F =
c∗
1 + Ω
,
b∗F = R
m∗m∗Fπ
∗
(
1 +Ω− π∗−1
)
,
bT∗ =
π∗
Γ∗ − 1
[b∗F + bF −Ω(m
∗
F +mF )] .
Steady state under Γ∗ = 1 Consider the case analyzed in section 4.1 where nominal
bond growth is zero, Γ∗ = 1. In this case, the foreign economy’s equilibrium conditions
are fundamentally affected. (101) changes to b∗F,t = m
R∗
F,t and thus, the real stock of
government bond holdings becomes irrelevant for the equilibrium allocation. Ignoring the
influence of foreign asset holdings (as in section 4.1), I obtain identical conditions as above,
except for the steady state holdings of government bonds. Household money holdings (96)
require
bF = R
m∗m∗Fπ
∗
(
1 + Ω− π∗−1
)
,
while the evolution of households’ bond holdings (101) requires b∗F = Ωm
∗
F . A steady state
exists only if both equations are satisfied, i.e. if
Rm∗ =
Ω
Ωπ∗ + π∗ − 1
.
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Thus, if the central bank targets zero inflation, π∗ = 1, the long-run policy rate has to be
zero as well. For π∗ = 1 and Rm∗ > 1, the economy has no steady state. The reason is that
the central bank acquires bonds every period in its open market operations when Rm > 1.
Given a nominally constant amount of bonds, and no steady state inflation, households’
real bond holdings then must decline.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
(60) implies that the decline in the liquidity premium is larger than the increase in the
interest rate on foreign government bonds if the foreign debt rate falls below its steady
state, RˆD∗t < 0. Consider the foreign economy under the assumptions in section 4.1,
i.e. u (c∗t , n
∗
t ) = log c
∗
t − χn
∗
t , binding cash and open market constraints, flexible prices,
constant nominal foreign government debt, Γ∗ = 1, zero steady state inflation π∗ = 1 as
well as a policy rate governed by Rm∗ = 1 and Rm∗t = R
m∗ρ
∗
t−1 exp
(
εRt
)
and a negligible
impact of home households’ holdings of foreign government bonds on foreign households’
holdings, b∗F,t = Ωm
∗
F,t. The set of equilibrium conditions describing the foreign economy
is then given by the linearized versions of (31) - (36), (41) with zero price dispersion
s∗t = 1, (43), binding open market and cash constraints (29) and (30), households’ money
holdings (50), labor demand w∗t = A
∗, the resource constraint y∗t = c
∗
t and the policy rule
Rm∗t = R
m∗ρ
∗
t−1 exp
(
εRt
)
. Substituting out Lagrange multipliers in (31) - (36) yields the
following system of linear equilibrium conditions
Rˆ∗t =EtRˆ
m∗
t+1, (120)
RˆD∗t =Etπˆ
∗
t+1, (121)
−Etcˆ
∗
t+1=Etπˆ
∗
t+1, (122)
cˆ∗t =
m∗F
c∗π∗
mˆ∗F,t−1 +
b∗F
c∗π∗Rm∗
(
bˆ∗F,t−1 − Rˆ
m∗
t
)
− πˆ∗t , (123)
mˆ∗F,t= cˆ
∗
t , (124)
Rˆm∗t = ρ
∗Rm∗t−1 + ε
R
t , (125)
bˆ∗F,t=Ω
m∗
b∗F
cˆ∗t , (126)
and conditions for the wage, production, injections and real government debt. Applying
the expectations operator to (123), and using (124) yields,
Etcˆ
∗
t+1 =
m
∗
F
c∗π∗
cˆ∗t +
b∗F
c∗π∗Rm∗
(
bˆ∗F,t −EtRˆ
m∗
t+1
)
−Etπˆ
∗
t+1.
Thus, (122) can be rewritten as
cˆ∗t = −π
∗
(
1 + Ω− π∗−1
) (
bˆ∗F,t −EtRˆ
m∗
t+1
)
,
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where I use the steady state relation b∗F /m
∗
F = R
m∗π∗
(
1 + Ω− π∗−1
)
derived in Appendix
A.3.2. Replacing bond holdings by (126) yields
cˆ∗t =−π
∗
(
1 + Ω− π∗−1
)(
Ω
m∗
b∗F
cˆ∗t −EtRˆ
m∗
t+1
)
=
Ω
1 +Ω
EtRˆ
m∗
t+1.
The debt rate is given by RˆD∗t = Etπˆ
∗
t+1 = −Etcˆ
∗
t+1, so that its solution reads
RˆD∗t = −ρa1Rˆ
m∗
t−1 − a1ε
R
t ,
where a1 = ρ
2 Ω
1+Ω > 0. Thus, a positive foreign policy shock leads to a decrease in the
private debt rate, which persists until the shock fades out. 
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